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a b s t r a c t
In this article we develop an analytical model of the selection process for R&D cooperative projects, to
study the factors that motivate public project selection and corresponding funding, using two different
financial instruments: subsidies and credits. For this purpose,we propose a three stage empirical strategy
to analyse the differential individual effects of several factors on the decisions taken by the public agency.
This analysis is based on project level data from cooperative R&D project calls under the Spanish PROFIT
initiative, for the period 2000-2003. The main results show that the public agency uses the two financial
instruments to address different objectives. First, some projects close to the market are well supported
through credits, while basic research projects receive only selective support in the form of subsidies. Sec-
ond, there is significant diversity in the selection and funding of technological areas. Third, regarding the
explicit goal of fostering cooperation, the public agency selectively favours partnershipswith universities
and technology institutes through the award of subsidies. However, there seems to be less incentive for
large consortia. Fourth, there are significant regional differences among financed projects and, also, our
data show sharp yearly fluctuations.
1. Introduction
The importance of research and development (R&D) as one of
the main contributors to sustainable growth in highly industrial-
ized economies is undisputed among economists, and especially in
the context of themodernknowledgebased economies. Thismeans
that government support for R&D activities is widely accepted, in
contrast to public support in the areas of investment, production or
commercial protection (García-Quevedo, 2004; Giebe et al., 2006;
Heijs, 2003). The broad consensus on the value of public support
for R&D is rooted in the existence of market failures (Arrow, 1962),
which create a gap between the private and social benefits deriv-
ing from R&D activities. This gap implies that private resources
dedicated to R&D activities will always be below the social opti-
mum (Klette et al., 2000). As consequence, since the mid 1980s,
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public expenditure oriented to supporting industrial R&D accounts
for some 30 per cent of total R&D expenditure in the OECD area
(OECD, 2001), and as much as 36 per cent in the European Union
(EU) countries. In the case of Spain the share of public funding of
R&D activities in the private sector is close to 40 per cent (OECD,
2001).
Technological agreements can be another solution to some
of the failures in technology markets, especially in the case of
appropriability (Cassiman, 2000) and uncertainty (Smith, 1991).
Some general trends (i.e. new scientific challenges more capital-
intensive or shorter life cycles of products) make the individual
actions of firms difficult, and increase the relevance of cooperation
in the innovation process (Heijs, 2005a). Cooperative agreements
boost firm innovativeness by their effective combining of partners’
resources and exploitation of complementarities (Kogut, 1988; Das
and Teng, 2000; Hagedoorn et al., 2000). Moreover, cooperation
generates externalities for society as a whole conceptualized in the
notion of collective learning (Heijs, 2005a).
In spite of the abovementioned benefits, there are several barri-
ers and transaction costs, especially those related to coordinating,
managing and controlling the activities of the different parties
involved, which could inhibit organizations’ engagement in tech-
0048-7333/$ – see front matter © 2010 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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nological cooperation (Becker and Dietz, 2004). Thus, considering
the impact of cooperation on private profits and social benefits,
the greatest challenge for public policy is to find mechanisms that
promote cooperation, usually the provision of funding (Bozeman,
2000). To this end, various support programmes have been imple-
mented in the US, Japan and the EU to encourage private R&D
efforts and research partnerships between private firms and pub-
lic research organizations (PROs). Someexamples are theAdvanced
Technology Program in the US and the successive European Frame-
work Programmes.
Many questions of political interest are suggested by the previ-
ous arguments and are a goodmotivation for this paper. According
to Fölster (1995), public funding for cooperative R&D is an effective
tool for encouraging private research and increasing cooperation in
linewith social incentives. However, it should be remembered that
research funding is an uncertain business, and the outputs of R&D
are not only equally uncertain, but also skewed (Molas-Gallart and
Salter, 2002). Under these conditions, one of the main problems
for research policy is how to distribute research funds to satisfy
multiple objectives.
According to Bozeman and Rogers (2001), public R&D man-
agement tends to be discrete and ad hoc, focusing on generating
maximum output through individual projects. In some cases, pub-
lic agencies use public funding mechanisms to attract firms to a
particular location (country or region), or to encourage techno-
logical upgrading in firms of particular importance (in terms of
employment, for instance) to the country or region. In this case,
the supply and distribution of funds among selected R&D projects
and firms is trying to fulfil a variety of goals (Blanes and Busom,
2004). However, if the selection criteria are not well defined, many
public programmes will fail to reach their targeted populations
(Blanes and Busom, 2004; Heijs, 2005b). This highlights the impor-
tance of clearly setting out the public sector evaluation criteria and
procedures for selecting and funding R&D projects.
The main contribution of this paper is in providing an analysis
of the selection process for cooperative R&D projects by studying
someof the factors that jointly influenceproject selectionand fund-
ing amounts, and by showing how different financial instruments
are used. Although there is a large tradition in the study of public
support schemes forR&Dactivities,3 toourknowledge, this is oneof
the few attempts to analyse the effects of simultaneous utilization
bypublic agencies of subsidies andcredits4 for fundingprojects.We
look particularly at the selection process adopted by a Spanish pub-
lic agency inchargeof fundingcooperativeR&Dprojectsusing these
two financial mechanisms: subsidies and credits. In doing so, the
purpose of the study is threefold: a) to identify some of the factors
influencing project selection and resources allocation; b) to analyse
theextent towhich the results of thepublic agency’s decisions com-
plywith themain goals establishedby the fundingprogramme; and
c) to showhow the twofinancial instruments–subsidies and credits
- are used. To carry out this work we use project level data from a
Spanish innovation support initiative, the PROFIT5 Programme, for
2000-2003. The sample consists of 2,790 project proposals, with an
acceptance rate of about 45%.
PROFIT is the Spanish government’s main technical innovation
support programme, designed to foster innovation in all sectors
(industry, government and research) and technological areas. It
3 This is particularly important in Spain. See, e.g. Molero and Buesa, 1995; Acosta
andModrego, 2001; Heijs, 2001, 2003, 2005b; Blanes and Busom, 2004; Herrera and
Heijs, 2007.
4 Huergo and Trenado (2008) analyse Spanish public aid for R&Dprojects from the
public agency point of view, although they were not able simultaneously to study
subsidies and credits: the programme they analyse is focused on credits.
5 PROFIT: ‘Programa de Fomento de la Innovación Tecnológica’ (Programme of Pro-
motion of Technological Innovation).
should be noted that the period 2000-2003 was the first period
when financial support was awarded explicitly to both individ-
ual and cooperative projects, implementing measures designed to
encourage the participation of one specific type of research organi-
zation, the technology institute (TI). The PROFIT data base contains
information on project inputs, expected outputs, research partners,
technological area or programme, geographical area of applicant
organizations and the year of call, which allows us to explore some
factors underlying the public selection of R&D cooperative projects
and the application of subsidies and credits. In this sense, this study
could be considered as complementing studies focused on the fac-
tors that lead a firm to participate in R&D subsidy programmes
(Acosta and Modrego, 2001; Blanes and Busom, 2004).
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we review the
existing literature, describe the PROFIT programme and, based on
this, develop arguments and conjectures about the public selection
of R&D cooperative projects. We describe the data, the variables
and the empirical strategy in Section 3, and discuss the results in
Section 4. Section 5 presents the conclusions.
2. Public selection and funding of cooperative R&D projects
The main trend in innovation policies during the last two
decades is characterized by what is termed the ‘cooperative
paradigm’, or the fostering of cooperation among sectors - indus-
try, government and research - and among rival or vertically related
firms (Bozeman, 2000). Public support for cooperationwould seem
to be justified if we take account of Von Hippel’s (1988) arguments
about the relevance of technological alliances and networks as the
main sources of innovation. In addition, according to Duysters et al.
(1999), alliances have shifted from being a somewhat peripheral
aspect to become a cornerstone of the firm’s technological strat-
egy. Therefore, public administrations, conscious of the potential
of technological agreements, do not hesitate to give financial sup-
port to the setting up of R&D collaborations, through a range of
R&D funding programmes, many explicitly focused on fostering
R&D cooperation (Geroski, 1992; Martin, 1996).
2.1. Public selection of R&D projects
Several studies have focused on evaluating the effectiveness of
R&D programmes (Meyer-Krahmer and Montigny, 1989; Ormala,
1989; Roessner, 1989) and their influence on private R&D efforts
(David et al., 2000; Klette et al., 2000). However, few works have
examined the criteria used by government evaluators to select
projects (Hsu et al., 2003; Lee and Om, 1996, 1997). Knowledge
of these criteria is crucial for two reasons: first they reflect the
real objectives of policy makers and, second they determine the
characteristics of those projects that are actually implemented or
developed and, consequently, the results obtained. Also, they can
affect not only responses to future calls, but also the definition and
content of project proposals.
In the context of R&D project selection in a private firm, top
management is obliged to resolve the crucial problem of adopt-
ing a proper selection method to identify those projects that fit
with organizational goals (Lee and Om, 1997). This has led to the
hundreds of methods and techniques available in the literature for
R&D project selection (Hsu et al., 2003). These approaches tend
to be either qualitative or quantitative, and range from unstruc-
tured peer review to sophisticated mathematical programming
(Henriksen and Traynor, 1999; Hsu et al., 2003). In the process of
R&D project selection, whatever method is used, one of the most
important steps is to calculate technical and market risks (Taggart
and Blaxter, 1992), a rather infrequent practice in the public sector
(Bozeman and Rogers, 2001, p. 414). So why is it so difficult for the
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public sector to apply a systematic and strategic R&D project man-
agement bearing inmind themagnitude of its government funding
decisions?
One plausible explanation is offered by Hsu et al. (2003) who
point to two major differences between public and private spon-
sored projects. Firstly, public funding of R&D projects generally
involves strategic and long-term investment, thus, conventional
financial justification approaches are probably inadequate. Sec-
ondly, the allocation of R&D resources in the public sector may
be influenced by political factors and a variety of interest groups.
Similarly, Bozeman and Rogers (2001) indicate that systematic and
strategic R&D programme management is difficult to accomplish
in the public sector for several reasons: i) government funded R&D
generally does not have commercial products and processes as its
short term objective; ii) public agencies are subject to annual bud-
get cycles; iii) the various goals of different government agencies
often conflict; and iv) time horizons are different.
The arguments in some of the existing studies lead us to con-
clude that selecting R&D projects for public evaluation is a difficult
task for several reasons related to expected externalities, multiple
objectives andmultiple stakeholders, someofwhommayhave con-
flicting objectives and preferences. These factors determine total
budget allocated to R&D programmes, distribution across indus-
tries, ranking criteria or screening rules applied in the selection of
projects and firms, and the funding awarded to individual firms
(Blanes and Busom, 2004, p. 1465). The question that arises, there-
fore, is how do these factors affect the selection process?
As a first step towards answering this question, and given that
the purpose of the paper is to study the factors that affect project
selection and funding within the Spanish PROFIT programme, we
provide a careful description of the programme. This is followed
by a rehearsal of some expectations related to the public selection
of R&D cooperative projects, based on PROFIT goals and its explicit
selection rules, as well as the theoretical arguments.
2.2. R&D cooperative projects: The case of the PROFIT programme
PROFIT is the major technical support programme of the Span-
ish government, integrated within the National Plan of Scientific,
Research, Development and Technological Innovation. It was first
run in 2000, as a continuation of previous innovation programmes
(Castro, 2001) and was distinguished by two new features: i) that
it provided funding for both individual and cooperative projects;
and ii) that two funding mechanisms (credits and subsidies) were
implemented simultaneously. By providing public funding, it was
seen as an instrument that would mobilize firms and other organi-
zations (especially universities and TIs) to undertake (more) R&D
activities.
The main objectives of the PROFIT initiative were to: i) increase
the application of knowledge and the incorporation of ideas in
the manufacturing process; ii) strengthen rapid growth industries
and markets; iii) boost the competitiveness of the manufacturing
sector by developing and incorporating new technologies; and iv)
promote the integration and cooperation of the different agents
involved in the science-technology-firm system.
PROFIT covered several knowledge fields which represent
priorities for Spanish technology policy. These included tech-
nological areas, such as Biotechnology, Industrial Design and
Production, Materials, Chemical Products and Processes, Natural
Resources, Agro-foods, Information and Communication Technolo-
gies, Biomedicine and Socioeconomics, and sectoral areas such as
Aeronautics, Automobiles, Energy, Environment, Information Soci-
ety and, Transport and Territorial Arrangements. In general, criteria
for eligibility and selection were uniform across these different
knowledge fields.
PROFIT enabled support for a wide typology of projects:
i) industrial research projects, oriented mainly towards basic
research; ii) pre-industry research technical viability studies; iii)
pre-competitive development projects to produce results useful for
industry; iv) technological demonstration projects to develop pilot
projects or demonstrate the results of Pre-Development projects;6
v) special actions oriented to diffusion activities7 (such as con-
ferences and seminars) and technology transfer; and vi) actions
to promote cooperation and participation in international R&D
programmes (i.e. EUREKA, IBEROEKA and the EU Framework Pro-
grammes).
Thefinancial instruments included interest free credits, andsub-
sidies. While generally the procedure was to assign either a credit
or a subsidy, in some cases, and for someprojects, the award of both
types of support was possible. However, there was a cap on project
funding - across all types of regions and all knowledge fields. This
cap was different for credits and subsidies. While a subsidy could
finance 100% of the project budget, a credit could represent only
75%.
The eligibility and selection rules applying to PROFIT knowledge
fields are related to: i) adequacy of PROFIT goals; ii) degree of inno-
vativeness and technological development of a project; iii) high
quality as well as technical, economical and financial viability; iv)
applicability of project results; v) promotion of cooperation; and vi)
promotion of R&Dactivity. Although someof these criteria (i.e. pro-
motion of cooperation) are clearly linked to the PROFIT goals, the
selection rules require a global valuation of each project. Thus, for
instance, the criteria ‘adequacy of goals’ implies analysis of project
coherence with some (but not necessarily all) of the PROFIT goals.
In other cases, such as the viability of the project, the key point is
not the fit of the project with PROFIT goals, but its possibility of
success. In any case, the PROFIT goals are more or less explicit in
the rules for eligibility and selection. Themain question then, given
these goals and selection rules, is which factors are the most criti-
cal in the process of selection and funding of cooperative projects
within the PROFIT programme.
2.3. Project selection by the PROFIT programme: some
expectations
Given the characteristics of the PROFIT programme, the pub-
lic agency is required to make three decisions in the course of the
selection process. First, the decision to accept or reject a project;
second,whether to assigna subsidy, a credit, or both to theaccepted
projects; and third, to decide how much of the project budget to
finance. Analysis of the three decisions sheds some light on the
public agency’s behaviour and particularly in relation to decisions
about the degree of support to different projects. The first deci-
sion is cut and dried, and either includes or excludes projects from
further consideration. The second and third decisions entail some
discrimination among the accepted projects in terms of type and
amountoffinanceprovided.Analysis of the seconddecisionenables
an examination of the different factors influencing the type of fund-
ing assigned. Analysis of the third decision allows us to show how
these characteristics influence the amount of the project budget
to be financed. Given that two different financial instruments are
implemented simultaneously in the PROFIT initiative, it is reason-
able to expect that they address different objectives.
With these three decisions in mind, we discuss our expecta-
tions related to the public agency’s selection and funding processes
6 Their final goals were development of a prototype, validation by the users, and
international projections.
7 Essentially, diffusion of firmR&D results and different public policy instruments
to support firms’ innovation processes.
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related to R&D projects, which are far from straightforward. In
all three decision phases, the public agency has multiple objec-
tives and selection criteria, some of which are contradictory. In
the specific context of the PROFIT programme, the main goals
are explicated in the public calls for proposals and in the selec-
tion criteria. Combining these with the theoretical arguments, we
can make various expectations about the selection of projects
for funding within this programme. We develop our expectations
about project characteristics and their fit with the abovemen-
tioned PROFIT goals. We also take account of certain other factors
not explicitly related to PROFIT goals, which may exert an influ-
ence along the different stages of the PROFIT programme selection
process.
2.3.1. Application of knowledge and ideas
Themain reason for providing public funding for R&D is market
failure; that is, the objective of the public agencies is to fund R&D
projects that otherwise would not be conducted because of exter-
nality problems or failures in the capital market. These projects are
usually those more distant from the market. However, as already
mentioned, one of the aims of the PROFIT initiative is to increase
the application of knowledge and the incorporation of ideas,within
the manufacturing process, and the applicability of project results
is one of the selection criteria. This implies that although PROFIT
provides funding to a wide typology of R&D projects, those closer
toachievinganapplicable result (i.e. pre-competitivedevelopment,
viability studies, demonstration, diffusion projects) aremore likely
to or will receive more support than those oriented towards basic
research.8 Other selection criteria relate to the degree of inno-
vativeness and technological development of a project and to its
promotion of R&D activity. These criteria suggest a positive atti-
tude towards projects with higher expected outputs in terms of
R&D expenses.
2.3.2. Industries and technological areas
According to Blanes and Busom (2004), public agencies may
use financial support for R&D to achieve two important goals: i)
to foster national champions; and ii) to encourage the technologi-
cal upgrading of firms in declining or traditional industries. In the
first case, the idea would be to fund those R&D projects that are
more likely to achieve technological and/or commercial success. In
the second case, the objective is to increase the chances of firm sur-
vival. Such reasoning implies that agencygoals, or thecombinations
of goals, will vary across industries.
ConcerningPROFIT goals, twoare informative about theorienta-
tion to specific industries. One is aimed at supporting rapid growth
industries andmarkets. This implies we could expect funding to be
directed especially to projects in sectors and knowledge areas that
are both new and technologically more advanced (i.e. Aeronautics,
Biomedicine) Another of PROFIT’s aims is to boost the competitive-
ness of the manufacturing sector by developing and incorporating
new technologies in industry. This is a horizontal goal, across all
industries, so would fit with the idea of technological upgrading of
firms inbothmatureandmore technologically advanced industries.
Taken together, these two main aims would suggests that there
are no knowledge areas that are discarded a priori, but that some,
that is, themore technology advanced,will receivemore favourable
consideration.
8 In fact, within the Spanish Government’s ‘R&D Plan 2000-2003’ there was a
funding programmeoriented specifically to basic research called ‘Promoción General
del Conocimiento’ (General Promotion of Knowledge), whichwas not included under
the PROFIT programme.
2.3.3. Cooperation
Technological cooperation is a mechanism used to solve some
forms of market failure (i.e. appropriability and uncertainty) and
to boost firm innovativeness (i.e. by combining resources and
exploiting complementarities). In spite of the problems related to
the management of alliances (i.e. transaction costs), their positive
impact has motivated governments to design public policies that
promote cooperation. In this context, PROFITwas aimed at the pro-
motion of cooperation among the different agents in the system:
science and technology organizations, academia, and firms. This
aim is made explicit in the main objectives and selection criteria of
PROFIT. Also, as discussed in the description of the PROFIT call, the
initiative is aimed especially at promoting collaboration between
firms and PROs (i.e. universities and TIs).
Since PROFIT encourages firms’ to exploit the knowledge
embedded in PROs, we would expect the process of selection to
be influenced by the degree of this cooperation. More precisely, we
wouldexpect amorepositive approach to thoseprojectswith auni-
versity or a TI partner. In addition, given the objective to promote
cooperation, we would expect the number of entities involved in
a project to be important in the public evaluation of R&D coopera-
tive projects. Consistent with this, we would also expect a positive
attitude of the public agency towards those projects oriented to
promoting and preparing international R&D partnerships (another
category within the PROFIT typology of projects).
2.3.4. Factors additional to PROFIT goals
In addition to the arguments related to PROFIT goals, public
assignment of funds may be conditional on other factors, such as
year of the call, applicant’s region, and project size. Bozeman and
Rogers (2001) highlight that public agencies are subject to annual
budget cycles and, moreover, that distribution of funds is condi-
tioned by demand. In this context, Shapira et al. (1995) highlight
the importanceof stablepublicprogrammes inorder to induce trust
and confidence in the target organizations. Thus, in order to con-
trol for the influence of annual budgetary cycles, it is necessary to
check for yearlydifferences in theprobabilityof anR&Dcooperative
project being accepted and financed.
The Spanish region of the applicant organization is another
factor that may influence funding. It is possible that regional dif-
ferences in the selection of projects are related to the peculiarities
of regional industrial systems (i.e. firm characteristics), which may
influence the level of support given to firms from different regions.
It is possible also that politics plays a part in regional differences.
The impact of political criteria is difficult to capture; it is likely also
thatpoliticswill enterotherareasof thedecisionmakingover selec-
tion and funding. However, it is important to control for regional
differences.
Finally, we would expect project size (Heijs, 2005b) to be sig-
nificant in the selection process. Acosta and Modrego (2001) find
that government evaluators favour large projects. Thus, we would
conjecture that the amount of inputs (measured by project budget
and number of project hours)would be important factors in project
selection.
Table 1 summarizes the potential factors affecting the process
of project selection in the PROFIT programme, and the empirical
expectations.
3. Data issues
3.1. A brief overview of the data
The information on the PROFIT initiative used in this study
comes from the Science and Technology Office administrative
database, which includes both accepted and rejected projects. This
4
  
Table 1
Potential factors affecting public selection and funding of R&D cooperative projects.
PROFIT goal Theoretical rational Empirical expectation
Increase application of knowledge and incorporation
of ideas in the manufacturing process
Market failures Preference for projects:
- near to the market (pre-competitive development,
viability studies, demonstration, or diffusion) rather
than those focused on basic research
- with higher amount of expected R&D
Strengthen rapid growth industries and markets Industries and technological areas Preference for projects:
- located in sectors and knowledge areas
technologically more advanced (i.e. Aeronautics or
Biomedicine)
Boost the competitiveness of the manufacturing sector
by developing and incorporating new technologies
Promote the integration and cooperation of the
different agents involved in the
science-technology-firm system
Cooperation Preference for projects:
- with the participation of universities and/or TI
- with a high number of partners
- with international R&D cooperations
Factors additional to PROFIT goals Annual, regional and project size differences in terms
of project support
Source: Own elaboration.
Table 2
Overview of projects.
Year of the call Total period 2000–2003
2000 2001 2002 2003
Number of project proposals 501 749 784 756 2790
Number (and percentage)a of accepted projects 250 (49.90%) 321 (42.86%) 315 (40.18%) 383 (50.66%) 1269 (45.48%)
Number (and percentage)a of projects with
subsidies
208 (41.52%) 244 (32.58%) 248 (31.63%) 307 (40.61%) 1007 (36.09%)
Average subsidy per project (D ) 206,162 78,768 66,481 85,435 103,034
Number (and percentage)a of projects with
credits
62 (12.38%) 110 (14.69%) 103 (13.14%) 109 (14.42%) 384 (13.76%)
Average credit per project 455,153 162,464 132,477 183,177 220,135
Number (and percentage)b of projects with
subsidy only
188 (75.20%) 211 (65.73%) 212 (67.30%) 274 (71.54%) 885 (69.67%)
Number (and percentage)b of projects with a
credit only
42 (16.80%) 77 (23.99%) 67 (21.27%) 76 (19.84%) 262 (20.56%)
Number (and percentage)b of projects with
both a subsidy and a credit
20 (8.00%) 33 (10.28%) 36 (11.43%) 33 (8.62%) 122 (9.77%)
a In total project proposals.
b In total accepted projects.
database provides information related to the decisions of the pub-
lic agency (to accept or reject the project, type of funding assigned,
and percentage of the project to be financed by subsidies and/or
credits), internal characteristics of theproject (plannedworkhours,
project budget, expected outputs, and type of research), techno-
logical and sectoral areas of the project, number of organizations
involved, collaboration with PROs (universities and/or TIs), the
Spanish region of each partner, and year of project proposal. Lack
of access to all project data and information, such as characteris-
tics of applicant organizations and the public agency’s perception
of project quality, means that these variables could not be included
in our analysis,9 and is a shortcoming of this work. Nevertheless,
we believe that our study is both interesting andnovel in exploiting
the public agency’s administrative database, which gives access to
the kind of information usually not available for academic analysis.
This allows us to apply econometric models that provide an alter-
native view to studies that focus on firms’ decisions. In this sense,
9 The confidentiality rules imposed by the Science and Technology Office provide
only restricted access to the database and particularly to information on individual
organizations and project evaluations.
this study could be seen as an example of the utility of administra-
tive information as a first approach to examining the coherence of
the decisions made by public agencies, with expected goals.
As already mentioned, a significant novelty of the PROFIT pro-
grammewas the inclusion of twomodes of funding for cooperative
projects, which could be implemented simultaneously: subsidies
or non-refundable grants, and advance payments (credits without
interest). In the period 2000-2003 the total number of coopera-
tive project proposals submitted was 2,790, of which 1,269 were
approved (45.48%). The average value of the subsidies awarded
was D103,034 per project and the average credit per project was
D220,135. Most of the funded projects (69.67%) received a sub-
sidy (and not a credit), while 20.56% received a credit only. Nearly
10% of approved projects received both a subsidy and a credit.
Tables 2 and 3 present the project information in detail.
Table 3 shows that project budget, planned work hours and
expected R&D outputs are higher in accepted projects, but that
this does not apply to number of partners and expected employ-
ment. These characteristics hold for the majority of knowledge
fields (project budget higher for accepted projects in 12 out of 15
fields, while planned worked hours is higher for accepted projects
in14out of the15fields, andexpectedR&D ishigher in11out of 15).
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Table 4
Empirical strategy.
Public agency decisions Empirical question Method of analysis
Step 1: Selecting or rejecting a project What are the factors behind the public selection of R&D
cooperative projects?
Probit
Step 2: Offering a subsidy and/or a credit What are the subtleties in the public selection of R&D cooperative
projects, where subsidies, credits or both may be assigned?
Bivariate probit conditional on selection
Step 3: Choosing what percentage of selected
projects’ budget to finance
Step 3A: What are the factors behind the percentage of subsidy
awarded?
Upper-limit Tobit conditional on having
received a subsidy
Step 3B: What are the factors behind the percentage of credit
awarded?
Upper-limit Tobit conditional on having
received a credit
Source: Own elaboration.
It shouldbenoted thatprojects are larger in someareas, depend-
ing on the indicator used: chemical products and process projects
are larger for project budget, planned work hours and expected
employment, Biomedical projects are bigger in terms of project
budget andplannedworkedhours, Information Societyprojects are
larger for number of partners and expected employment, Socioeco-
nomic projects are larger for number of partners and Aeronautics
and Automobile projects rank as large for expected R&D.
3.2. Empirical strategy
The empirical analysis is focused on the three main decisions
taken by the public agency in relation to selection of R&D coop-
erative projects for funding (Table 4). The funding authority first
decides on the projects that will be selected, and then, conditional
on acceptance, which type of financial instrument (subsidy and/or
credit) will be awarded. Finally, the decision is made about what
percentage of the project, conditional on the instrument used, will
befinanced. In the econometric specification, thefirst two steps can
be modelled as a bivariate probit with selection. First, we model
a two-stage process, estimating as a first stage through a probit
model and computing the inverse Mills ratio, which is included in
the second stage, as a covariate to account for the selection bias.
The second stage is estimated as a bivariate probit.10 The third
stage - percentage of the project to be financed - is modelled using
twoupper-limit Tobit, that take account of the financial instrument
assigned (including the inverseMills ratio computed to account for
the financial instrument selection). The choice of an upper-limit
Tobit is based on the fact that there is a cap on the funding offer
(100% in the case of a subsidy and 75% in the case of a credit) .11
The first decision that the public evaluator must make is
whether to accept or reject the project. The propensity of a project
to be selected is assumed to be represented by a latent variable (S*),
which depends on a number of factors derived from the theoretical
framework and the objectives of PROFIT. These factors are summa-
rizedasproject characteristics related toPROFITgoals (Xj) andother
factors (Zj). This reduces the selection mechanism to an equation,
on the basis of which the projects are accepted or rejected.
Thus, in order to explore the criteria used by public agency to
assess whether or not to select a cooperative project, we estimate
a probit model:
S∗j = ˇ0 + ˇ1 · Xj + ˇ2 · Zj + εj (1)
The second decision required of the public agency is related to
the financial instrument assigned. Conditional on project accep-
10 As a sensibility analysis we also estimated two separate probits in this second
stage (excluding projects that were awarded both a subsidy and a credit).
11 As another sensibility analysis, we repeated the two Tobit regressions of this
third-stage, but excluding the projects that received both subsidy and credit.
tance, the agency decideswhether to offer a subsidy and/or a credit.
Given that a credit (although without interest) is different from a
subsidy or a non-refundable grant (in the sense it has to be repaid),
it would seem reasonable to expect somewhat different utiliza-
tion of the credit award compared to a subsidy. However, to our
knowledge, no attempts have beenmade to analyse how the public
administration uses these two types of financing within the same
call. Some preliminary evidence can be gleaned from data, in that
the mean value for credit per project is substantially higher than
the mean value for subsidy per project.
As these two types of financial instruments may be related, the
error terms in the two probit models (subsidies and credits) are
likely to be correlated. Thus, an extension of the probit known as
the bivariate probit (Greene, 2000) is usually themost appropriate.
Thus, our model has two steps. The first refers to the selection of
projects (the first decision) and the second refers to the decision
to award a subsidy and/or a credit. This second decision is only
observed if the project is selected so that we need to account for
sample selection (Greene, 2000).
1) Selection equation:
S∗j = ˇ0 + ˇ1 · Xj + ˇ2 · Zj + εj (2)
where Sj =1 if S∗j > 0, and Sj =0 in other case
2) Type of funding equation:
F∗1j = ˛
1
0 + ˛
1
1 · Xj + ˛
1
2 · Zj +
1
j
F∗2j = ˛
2
0 + ˛
2
1 · Xj + ˛
2
2 · Zj +
2
j
(3)
where,
E(1
j
) = E(2
j
) = 0
Var(1
j
) = Var(2
j
) = 1
Cov(1
j
,2
j
) = 
and Fij is observed only if Sj =1, with F1j =1 if F∗1j > 0 and F2j =1
if F∗2j > 0 are respectively F1j subsidies and F2j credits.
Using thismodelwe try to identifypotential subtleties in the fac-
tors determining the assignment of a subsidy or a credit, through
the estimation of the coefficient vectors ˛i1 and ˛
i
2, of  (the cor-
relation between the error terms εij in the equations), and the
standard errors for these parameters. In this estimation procedure,
we assume that the perturbations εtj, t=1,2 are distributed jointly
as a bivariate normal. If they are statistically significantly correlated
( /= 0), thebivariatemodel ismore effective than the separatepro-
bit models (Greene, 2000, pp. 853–854).12 In both equations, we
include project characteristics and contextual factors as explana-
tory variables.We also include as a covariate the inverseMills ratio
computed after the first step to account for the selection bias. In
12 And this is the case here, as showed in the sensibility analysis.
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order to avoid identification problems (Hamilton and Nickerson,
2003), we exclude two of the variables (Expected investment and
Expected employment) in this second-stage estimation.
Finally, the third decision is related to the evaluator’s choice
about the percentage of the budgets of the selected projects to
finance. This decision is conducted in two steps. Step 3A repre-
sents the decision related to the percentage of subsidy (conditioned
by the award of a subsidy) and step 3B represents the decision
related to the percentage of credit (conditioned by the award of
a credit). Accordingly, we model two upper-limit Tobits, one for
subsidies and one for credits. This choice is based on the existence
of a cap on the funding that can be offered (100% for subsidies
and 75% for credits), while there is not constraint regarding the
participation decision (lower limit) since we observe only positive
outcomes. To account for the selection of the financial instrument
we include the corresponding inverse Mills ratio. The model is
based on Maddala (1983). Our main concern is in estimating the
parameters in the following two-model equations (step 3A and
step 3B):
Step 3A : P∗1j = 
1
0 + 
1
1 · Xj + 
1
2 · Zj + 
1
j (4)
Step 3B : P∗2j = 
2
0 + 
2
1 · Xj + 
2
2 · Zj + 
2
j (5)
and
P1j = 100 ifP
∗
1j ≥ 100 (6)
P1j = P
∗
1j ifP
∗
1j < 100 (7)
P2j = 75 ifP
∗
2j ≥ 100 (8)
P2j = P
∗
2j ifP
∗
2j < 75 (9)
where P∗1j and P
∗
2j are the latent variables for the respective percent-
ages of the budget being financed by a subsidy and a credit, and S1i
and S2i are the endogenous variables so that P1j is observed only
if F1j =1 and P2j is observed only if F2j =1. Table 4 summarizes our
empirical strategy.
3.3. Variables
3.3.1. Dependent variables
According toour empirical strategy, thefirst decision is captured
by a dichotomous variable (Selected project) that takes the value
1 if the project was selected and 0 if it was rejected. Regarding
the second decision, we need to distinguish the financial instru-
ment assigned - credit or subsidy. With this aim, we defined
two dichotomous variables: (i) Subsidy, which takes the value 1
if the project was financed by a subsidy; and (ii) Credit, which
takes the value 1 if the project was financed by a credit. Nei-
ther variable is mutually exclusive because some projects (fewer
than 10%) are financed by both types of instrument. The third
decision is related to the percentage of the project budget to
be financed by the PROFIT programme. We capture this decision
through two variables: (i) Subsidy financed, which is the percent-
age of the project budget financed by a subsidy; and (ii) Credit
financed,which is thepercentageof theproject budgetfinancedbya
credit.
3.3.2. Independent variables
Coherent with our theoretical framework, the factors that
explain the public agency’s decisions are identified according to
their match with PROFIT goals and other control variables.
Regarding the goal of increasing the application of knowl-
edge and incorporation of ideas in the manufacturing process, the
database allows us to identify the type of project and the poten-
tial effects (expected outputs) of carrying out each project. As
mentioned in the PROFIT description, we identified the type of
project according to its research orientation. In particular, we iden-
tified projects oriented towards basic research (Industrial research),
technical viability studies (Viability studies), pre-competitive devel-
opment projects (Pre-development), technological demonstration
projects (Demonstration), diffusionactivities (Diffusion), andactions
to promote participation in international cooperative R&D pro-
grammes (International). We captured these effects by means of
six dichotomous variables, using Industrial research as the refer-
ence category. Regarding expected outputs, we can analyse this
effect on the selection process and financing decisions through
the variables for expected growth in R&D expenses (expected
R&D), expected industrial investments (expected investments), and
expected employment (expected employment) as project outcomes.
In order to avoid identification problems, we employ the variables
Expected investmentsandExpectedemploymentonly in thefirst stage
estimation. We do not exclude Expected R&D given that it fits with
one explicit selection criterion in the PROFIT initiative.
Another factor that we need to account for in our empiri-
cal analysis is the industry effect; however, lack of individual
firm data means that we need to use information on techno-
logical and sectoral areas of projects to proxy for some industry
characteristics. We consider the variables associated with several
knowledge fields which represent priorities in Spanish technology
policy and are included in the PROFIT programme.We look particu-
larly at Biotechnology, Industrial Design and Production, Materials,
Chemical Products and Processes, Natural Resources, Agro-foods,
Information and Communication Technologies, Biomedicine and
Socioeconomics. It also includes sectoral areas such as Aeronau-
tics, Automobiles, Energy, Environment, Information Society and,
Transport and Territorial Arrangements. We captured the effects
of these technological and sectoral areas by means of 15 dichoto-
mous variables. Industrial Design and Production is the reference
category.
The database provides information related to the goal of pro-
moting cooperation among the different agents involved in the
science-technology-firm system. In particular, to check the influ-
ence of research organizations (universities and TIs) in the project
selection process, we constructed two dichotomous variables
reflecting whether Universities and/or Technology Institutes were
among the project partners. In addition, we can measure the num-
ber of organizations involved in the project (Partners) in order to
analyse the influence of consortium size.
In order to capture other factors beyond PROFIT goals the
database allows us to identify the year of the call, the applicant’s
region, and the project size. We want to control for the year of
the project proposal in order to capture fluctuations in the annual
demand for funds or the effect of annual budget cycles. We con-
structed four dichotomous variables related to the year of the call
(Year 2000; Year 2001; Year 2002 and Year 2003); Year 2000 is the
reference category. To capture regional differences, we employed
a dummy for each Spanish region with at least one organization
involved in a project. Here, it is important to take account of the
fact that several organizations are involved in each project, and
these organizations may be located in different regions. 48.48% of
projects involve organizations from at least two different regions
and 11.47% of projects involve organizations from at least three
regions. Thus, we avoid multicollinearity problems if we include
all regions in the estimation process. Finally, wemeasured the total
planned number of working hours by qualified personnel (Hours),
which could be interpreted as a proxy for project size. Also, related
to project size we included the total amount of the project budget
(Budget).
Table 5 provides descriptive statistics and correlations of the
independent variables used in the study. The Appendix B provides
a description of how the variables were constructed.
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Table 6
Selection of R&D cooperative projects (Step 1).
Model 1 (Probit)
Selected project
Pre-development 0.229*** (3.47)
Demonstration 0.197* (1.74)
Viability Studies 0.300** (2.43)
Diffusion 0.208** (2.03)
International 1.009*** (6.14)
Expected R&D 0.014 (0.52)
Expected investment 0.302** (2.55)
Expected employment (0.034 ((1.36)
Sector 1 (0.061 ((0.45)
Sector 3 (0.645*** ((5.87)
Sector4 (0.174 ((1.05)
Sector 5 (0.688*** ((4.04)
Sector 6 (0.674*** ((4.94)
Sector 7 (0.076 ((0.94)
Sector 8 (0.617*** ((3.40)
Sector 9 (0.356 ((1.52)
Sector 10 0.408** (2.01)
Sector 11 0.724*** (3.73)
Sector 12 (0.277** ((2.19)
Sector 13 (0.222** ((2.01)
Sector 14 (0.179** ((1.99)
Sector 15 (0.118 ((0.72)
Universities 0.081 (1.39)
Technology Institutes (0.058 ((0.88)
Partners (0.025 ((1.46)
Year 2001 (0.188** ((2.42)
Year 2002 (0.299*** ((3.83)
Year 2003 0.009 (0.11)
Region 1 (0.095 ((1.20)
Region 2 (0.001 ((0.01)
Region 3 (0.303* ((1.86)
Region 4 0.306*** (3.62)
Region 5 (0.075 ((0.45)
Region 6 (0.024 ((0.12)
Region 7 (0.139 ((0.80)
Region 8 (0.090 ((0.87)
Region 9 (0.048 ((0.77)
Region 10 (0.206* ((1.72)
Region 11 0.279 (1.15)
Region 12 0.235*** (4.15)
Region 13 0.054 (0.41)
Region 14 0.133 (1.20)
Region 15 0.226*** (3.43)
Region 16 0.087 (0.46)
Budget (0.033* ((1.72)
Hours 0.377*** (8.13)
Constant (0.067 ((0.64)
Number of observations 2790
Wald test of full model: 2 306.47***
Log pseudo-likelihood (1732.62
Robust z-statistic shown in parenthesis.
* p<0.10.
** p<0.05.
*** p<0.01.
4. Empirical analysis
The empirical analysis follows the three stages proposed in the
empirical strategy. First, we analyse the factors underlying the
public selection of R&D cooperative projects. Second, for selected
projects, we explore the subtleties involved in the assignment of
subsidies and/or credits. Third, we examine the factors influencing
what percentage of the budget to finance.
4.1. Results for the first step: project selection
Table 6 provides empirical evidence on the factors that underlie
public selection of cooperative R&D projects (Model 1). Analy-
sis of this first decision is critical given that it identifies what
determines selection of exclusion of a project from the PROFIT
initiative.
Results show that project characteristics related to PROFIT goals
are very influential in the agency’s selection decision. First, there
is a preference for projects that are closer to the market than
those related to basic research. In particular, Pre-Development,
Demonstration, Viability Studies, and Diffusion projects are more
frequently funded than Industrial Research projects (control cate-
gory). Second, in relation to expected outputs, projects with higher
expected investment are also preferred, but neither expected
employment opportunities nor R&D is significant. Third, there are
many selection differences across knowledge areas. The probability
of funding is higher for Automobiles and Aeronautics projects than
for Design and Industrial Production (reference category) projects,
while funding of Materials, Natural Resources, Agro-foods, Socioe-
conomics, Energy, Environment and Information Society projects is
less likely compared to the reference category. Fourth, the variables
related to cooperation generally do not show any significant influ-
ence on the probability of a project’s being selected, the exception
being projects related to International Cooperation, which shows a
high probability of being selected.
There are other factors in addition to PROFIT goals that exert
a significant influence on the initial decision to select a project.
First, we find that the year of the proposal is relevant. More pre-
cisely, projects in 2001 and 2002 (themid point years in the PROFIT
initiative) were more frequently rejected than proposals submit-
ted in 2000 (reference year). Second, there are regional disparities:
projects with the participation of organizations fromC. Valenciana,
Madrid and País Vasco have a significantly higher chance of being
selected,while applications fromBaleares andGalicia are less likely
to be awarded funding. Finally, the two variablesmeasuring project
inputs are both statistically significant. More precisely, the public
agency gives preference to projects with high numbers of working
hours and low budgets.
4.2. Results of the second step: assigning the financial instrument
The use of two different financial instruments in the PROFIT ini-
tiative involves a much more detailed analysis of the behaviour of
the public agency allocating resources to cooperative projects. Tak-
ing account of the first decision to select or reject a project, the next
step is whether to assign a subsidy and/or a credit. Table 7 presents
the bivariate probit model estimation for the subtleties in the pub-
lic assignment of credits and subsidies (Model 2). The test reveals
that correlation of the error terms of the twomodels (subsidies and
credits) is statistically significant, which is an indication that the
bivariate model is more effective than the separate probit models
(Greene, 2000, pp. 853–854). In order to account for selection bias
we included as a covariate the inverse Mills ratio computed from
the first stage. The fact that it is significant shows that selection
exists and that the use of this variable enables unbiased estimates.
As in the first stage, several factors related to PROFIT goals are
important in the assignment of the financial instrument. Concern-
ing type of project, Pre-Development and Demonstration projects
have a higher probability than Industrial Research projects of being
awarded a credit and a lower probability of being awarded a sub-
sidy,whileDiffusionprojects have a lowerprobability of receiving a
credit. ExpectedR&Ddoesnothavean impacton theawardof either
a subsidy or a credit. In terms of knowledge areas, some are less
likely to receive a subsidy compared to Design and Industrial Pro-
duction projects (Chemical Products and Processes, Biomedicine,
EnergyandEnvironment) and someare less likely to receive a credit
(Materials, ICTs and Information Society). Chemical Products and
Processes and Automobiles projects are more likely to be awarded
credit. In relation to cooperation, participation of a university or a
TI increases the probability of a subsidy and decreases the proba-
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Table 7
Assignment of subsidies and credits conditional on selection (Step 2).
Model 2 (Bivariate probit with selection)
Subsidy Credit
Pre-development (0.739*** ((5.03) 0.663*** (4.96)
Demonstration (0.742*** ((3.44) 0.567*** (2.82)
Viability Studies 0.012 (0.04) 0.283 (1.30)
Diffusion 0.284 (1.24) (0.392* ((1.84)
International 1.126*** (2.80) (0.885*** ((2.73)
Expected R&D 0.079 (1.54) (0.049 ((0.85)
Sector 1 0.112 (0.68) (0.139 ((0.82)
Sector 3 0.296 (0.95) (0.957*** ((3.12)
Sector4 (1.341*** ((4.51) 0.784*** (2.73)
Sector 5 (0.575 ((1.20) 0.421 (1.03)
Sector 6 (0.561 ((1.27) (0.078 ((0.20)
Sector 7 0.169 (1.21) (0.525*** ((4.18)
Sector 8 (0.012 ((0.21) 0.039 (0.51)
Sector 9 (1.001*** ((2.31) 0.177 (0.41)
Sector 10 (0.401 ((1.32) 0.079 (0.27)
Sector 11 0.339 (1.11) 0.606** (2.10)
Sector 12 (0.520** ((1.98) 0.373* (1.70)
Sector 13 (0.603*** ((3.03) 0.294 (1.55)
Sector 14 0.219 (1.28) (0.686*** ((4.28)
Sector 15 (0.313 ((1.25) (0.020 ((0.08)
Universities 1.173*** (9.27) (0.843*** ((8.08)
Technology Institutes 0.831*** (5.91) (0.855*** ((6.64)
Partners (0.030 ((0.88) (0.021 ((0.58)
Year 2001 (0.280* ((1.90) 0.227* (1.72)
Year 2002 (0.365** ((2.35) 0.296** (2.02)
Year 2003 0.027 (0.19) (0.001 ((0.01)
Region 1 0.301* (1.69) (0.369** ((2.26)
Region 2 0.168 (0.76) (0.081 ((0.46)
Region 3 (0.185 ((0.51) 0.052 (0.15)
Region 4 0.533*** (2.83) (0.385** ((2.27)
Region 5 0.469 (1.22) (0.537 ((1.52)
Region 6 0.129 (0.32) 0.131 (0.38)
Region 7 (0.092 ((0.28) (0.018 ((0.05)
Region 8 0.086 (0.35) (0.231 ((0.99)
Region 9 (0.062 ((0.49) 0.152 (1.35)
Region 10 (0.294 ((1.19) 0.221 (0.98)
Region 11 0.022 (0.05) 0.171 (0.42)
Region 12 0.371*** (2.88) (0.175 ((1.55)
Region 13 0.013 (0.04) (0.034 ((0.13)
Region 14 (0.166 ((0.88) 0.137 (0.74)
Region 15 0.179 (1.27) (0.123 ((0.97)
Region 16 (0.064 ((0.23) 0.129 (0.45)
Budget (0.418* ((1.87) 0.279 (1.19)
Hours 0.191** (2.40) 0.068 (0.93)
Constant (0.358 ((0.83) 0.521 (1.30)
Inverse Mills Ratio 1.431*** (3.43) (0.912** ((2.33)
Number of observations 1269
LR∼2:  =0 2 =623.91***
Wald test of full model: 2 383.38***
Log pseudo-likelihood (757.57
Robust z-statistic shown in parenthesis.
* p<0.10.
** p<0.05.
*** p<0.01.
bility of a credit. Number of partners has no influence on the award
of either type of financial instrument. Finally, projects related to
International Cooperation are associated with a higher probability
of receiving a subsidy and a lower probability of receiving a credit.
Other factors include year differences. The model shows that
fewer subsidies but more credits were awarded in 2001 and
2002 compared to 2000. There are also some regional differences.
Projects from Madrid, Andalucía and Comunidad Valenciana are
positively related to the award of a subsidy, while project appli-
cations from Andalucía and Comunidad Valenciana are negatively
related to theassignmentof credits. In termsofproject inputs, num-
ber of hoursworked positively affects the award of a subsidy, while
the influence of project budget is negative. However, neither input
has a significant influence on the assignment of a credit. Finally,
we conducted a sensibility analysis in order to explore the effect
when projects awarded both subsidies and credits (122 in total)
were excluded and, thus, independent probits, were applied. The
results in Annex 1 show that there are hardly any differences.
4.3. Results of the third step: budget financed
The third step in our empirical strategy is to analyse the fac-
tors influencing the percentage of the budget financed, conditional
on second step decision (assignment of a subsidy and/or a credit).
We estimated two upper-limit Tobits to account for the cap on
the amount of funding provided (100% for subsidies and 75% for
credits). To account for which financial instrument is selected we
included the inverse Mills ratio computed from the second stage.
Table 8 shows the results of the two upper limit Tobits for esti-
mating factors that influence the percentage of subsidy financed
(Model 3A) and the percentage of credit financed (Model 3B).
Concerning type of project, Pre-Development and Demon-
stration projects receive lower percentages of subsidies than do
Industrial Research projects, while Demonstration and Diffusion
projects receive higher proportions of credits. Viability studies are
awarded a lower percentage of credits, while expected R&D shows
no differences in relation to percentage of credits or subsidies. In
termsofknowledgeareas, some (Aeronautics and InformationSoci-
ety) receive higher percentages of both subsidies and credits, while
Automobiles receives a lower percentage of both types of financ-
ing. Biomedicine and ICT projects receive higher percentages of
credit. Materials, Chemicals, Biomedicine, Agro-foods and Energy
projects receive lower percentages of subsidy. If universities or TI
are involved, the percentage of the budget subsidized is higher,
while the proportion of credit is lower if one of the project part-
ners is a university. Number of partners has a negative effect on the
percentage of subsidy funding.
Regarding year differences, in 2001 the percentages of subsidy
and credit were both low; in 2002 the percentage of subsidies was
lower than in 2000, and in 2003 only the percentage of credit was
higher. In terms of regional effects, projectswith participation from
organizations in certain regions, such as Andalucía, C. Valenciana,
Canarias, Madrid, Murcia and País Vasco, received higher percent-
ages of subsidy (but not credit) while projects with participation
of organizations from Navarra received lower percentages of sub-
sidy (but not credit). Projects with partners from Cantabria receive
a lower percentage of credit (but not subsidy), while the reverse is
true for projects with partners from Baleares and Asturias (higher
percentage of credit, though no effect on subsidies). For inputs,
project budget has a negative effect only on the percentage of credit
financing (with no influence on subsidies). In contrast to previous
analyses, number of hours worked is no longer important, that is, it
does not affect the percentage of either credit or subsidy received.
Finally, as in the second stage, a sensibility analysis was con-
ducted in order to explore the robustness of our results when
excluding projects awarded both a subsidy and a credit: the results
hardly differ (Annex 2).
5. Summary of findings and concluding remarks
The objective of this paper was to analyse the process of
selection for cooperative R&D projects within the Spanish PROFIT
initiative. The study explored three important aspects: (a) the fac-
tors underlying project selection and resource allocation; (b) the
coherence between the public agency’s decisions and the main
goals of the funding programme; and (c) the particularities behind
the simultaneous use of subsidies and credits.We based our empir-
ical analysis onproject level data from the Spanish PROFIT initiative
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Table 8
Funding of R&D cooperative projects by financial instrument (Step 3).
Model 3A (upper
limit Tobit)
Model 3B (upper
limit Tobit)
Subsidy financed Credit financed
Pre-development −0.111*** (−6.85) 0.037 (1.46)
Demonstration −0.073*** (−3.00) 0.095*** (2.92)
Viability Studies −0.011 (−0.39) −0.117*** (−2.63)
Diffusion 0.022 (0.76) 0.120** (2.25)
International 0.089 (1.54) −0.007 (−0.07)
Expected R&D −0.002 (−0.37) 0.005 (0.53)
Sector 1 −0.046* (−1.68) −0.067 (−0.95)
Sector 3 −0.143*** (−3.71) −0.007 (−0.14)
Sector4 −0.295*** (−4.76) −0.038 (−0.99)
Sector 5 −0.022 (−0.30) 0.009 (0.22)
Sector 6 −0.103* (−1.95) −0.054 (−1.32)
Sector 7 0.027 (1.44) 0.130*** (4.55)
Sector 8 0.017 (0.31) 0.004 (0.08)
Sector 9 −0.098* (−1.83) 0.161*** (2.89)
Sector 10 0.110** (2.51) 0.137*** (3.02)
Sector 11 −0.098** (−2.34) −0.089** (−2.17)
Sector 12 −0.144*** (−3.83) 0.021 (0.39)
Sector 13 −0.033 (−0.90) 0.047* (1.71)
Sector 14 0.041** (2.04) 0.143*** (4.49)
Sector 15 0.025 (0.60) 0.056 (0.96)
Universities 0.199*** (6.33) −0.115*** (−4.22)
Technology Institutes 0.084*** (4.54) −0.022 (−0.72)
Partners −0.008** (−2.37) 0.008 (1.33)
Year 2001 −0.039** (−1.99) −0.061** (−2.51)
Year 2002 −0.079*** (−3.56) −0.026 (−0.97)
Year 2003 0.006 (0.43) 0.073*** (2.68)
Region 1 0.033* (1.90) −0.036 (−1.19)
Region 2 0.007 (0.35) −0.018 (−0.54)
Region 3 −0.052 (−1.30) 0.083* (1.69)
Region 4 0.104*** (4.43) 0.007 (0.21)
Region 5 0.163*** (3.09) −0.089 (−1.57)
Region 6 0.088* (1.83) −0.163* (−1.78)
Region 7 −0.049 (−1.26) 0.045 (0.80)
Region 8 0.025 (1.05) −0.024 (−0.48)
Region 9 −0.001 (−0.01) −0.009 (−0.45)
Region 10 −0.027 (−0.78) 0.035 (0.79)
Region 11 −0.016 (−0.26) 0.025 (0.51)
Region 12 0.092*** (4.01) −0.021 (−1.06)
Region 13 0.057** (2.11) −0.006 (−0.12)
Region 14 −0.051** (−2.44) −0.024 (−0.61)
Region 15 0.036* (1.84) −0.009 (−0.46)
Region 16 −0.006 (−0.14) 0.092* (1.84)
Budget −0.042 (−1.47) −0.020*** (−4.57)
Hours −0.003 (−0.30) 0.001 (0.10)
Constant 0.121* (1.78) 0.574*** (9.17)
Inverse Mills Ratio 0.245*** (2.65) 0.001 (0.03)
Number of observations 1007 384
Log likelihood −322.15 −133.98
Robust z-statistic shown in parenthesis.
* p<0.10
** p<0.05.
*** p<0.01.
in the period 2000–2003 in order to investigate these aspects. The
econometric specification followed the three steps of the public
agency’s decision-making process in the PROFIT programme. That
is, to select or reject a project; to assign a credit and/or a subsidy;
and to decide what percentage of the budget would be financed
using these tools.
In order to understand this decision-making process, we anal-
ysed the roles played by several project characteristics related to
PROFIT goals, aswell as some other factors. This allowed us to iden-
tify drivers whose impact on project selection and funding differs.
Moreover, as expected, there are differences in the use of credits
and subsidies. The reason why the Spanish Government imple-
mented the two instruments in the same call probablywas tomake
a distinction among project proposals through the award of a credit
or a subsidy. Table9 summarizes thesepublic choicedriversbyclas-
sifying them into a typology of four groups: (i) those that contribute
positively to both selection and funding (Type 1: ‘High support’);
(ii) those that contribute positively to selection, but not funding
(Type2: ‘Something for everybody’); (iii) those thatdonot influence
selection but do influence funding (Type 3: ‘Selective support’); and
(iv) those that do not affect public choice of a project nor its funding
(Type 4: ‘Low support’). Table 9 also shows selection among these
factors based on the financial instrument applied (subsidy or credit
or both).
Type of project is highly relevant in the selection process. In
the first stage there is a clear preference for projects that are
closer to the market than basic research programmes (i.e. Indus-
trial Research projects). This result is in line with the PROFIT goal
of increasing the application of knowledge, and with the selection
criterionof applicability of results. Ifwedifferentiatebetweencred-
its and subsidies we observe that some projects closer to market
(Demonstration, Diffusion) are more likely to be awarded credit
while for Pre-Development and Viability studies there is some-
thing for everyone, again based on credit. Finally, projects that are
far from the market (Industrial Research) receive selective support
through subsidies. In otherwords, the agencyuses the twofinancial
tools to address different objectives.
In terms of outputs, expected investment seems to increase the
probability of a project being selected. However, expected R&D
does not exert a significant influence along the selection process.
Accordingly, the selection criteria of increasing R&D activity is not
addressed by higher support for projects whose results could serve
as inputs for future R&D projects.
In terms of knowledge areas,we observe that, irrespective of the
financial tool, some areas (Aeronautics) receive high levels of sup-
port, some receive selective support (Information Society), while
in other areas (Automobiles) there is something for everybody
and others receive low support (Natural Resources, Socioeco-
nomic, Environment). However, we also find differences between
the financial tools. More traditional sectors, such as Industrial
Design andProduction, receive high support through subsidies, and
new technologies (Biomedicine and ICTs) are selectively supported
using credits. Similarly, other technology intensive areas (Materi-
als, Chemicals, Agro-foods, Energy) receive low support through
subsidies. That is, the agency uses the financial tools to make com-
patible the existence of different objectives.
Concerning cooperative factors, there is a ‘selective support’,
basically through subsidies, of projects with the involvement of a
university and/or a TI. This result show a partial coherencewith the
PROFIT goal of promoting cooperation among the different agents
in the science-technology-firm system. This ‘selective support’ for
projects with TI involvement is also coherent with the explicit
addition of these organizations in the public call. Contrary to our
expectations, number of partners does not have a positive effect
on project selection and funding (‘low support’). In this case, the
PROFIT initiative does not seem to foster large consortia. On the
other hand, the specific and strong support for projects oriented
towards international R&D cooperation is aligned to the PROFIT
goal of encouraging cooperation. In international projects there is
something for everybody, but in the form of subsidies.
In relation to other factors underlying the selection process
there are differences in terms of year of the call. In 2001 there
was ‘low support’, especially through subsidies (and in 2001 also
credits), while in 2000 there was ‘high support’ from both types
of funding. There are several possible explanations for this. First,
the higher rate of acceptance in the first year works to increase the
number of applications in subsequent years. Second, the allocation
of funds in 2000 was out of proportion, and reduced the amount of
resources available for subsequent years. We can see that in 2003
(the final year of the PROFIT initiative) projects received ‘selective
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Table 9
Summary of public choice drivers.
Financial instrument used
to discriminate projects
Type 1: High support Type 2: Something for
everybody
Type 3: Selective support Type 4: Low support
Basically subsidies Input: Hours
Type of project: International Type of project: Industrial Research
Cooperation: Universities,
Technology Institutes
Cooperation: Partners
Knowledge area: Industrial
Design and Production
Knowledge area:
Materials; Chemicals;
Agro-foods; Energy
Region: C. Valenciana; Madrid;
País Vasco
Region: Andalucía; Canarias; Murcia Region: Navarra
Year of the call: 2002
Basically credits Type of project: Demonstration;
Diffusion
Type of project:
Pre-Development; Viability
Studies
Knowledge area: Biomedicine; ICTs
Region: Baleares; Asturias Region: Cantabria
Year of the call: 2003
Both instruments without
distinction
Expected output: Investment Input: Budget
Knowledge area: Aeronautics Knowledge area: Automobiles Knowledge area: Information
Society
Knowledge area:
Natural Resources;
Socioeconomics;
Environment
Region: Galicia
Year of the call: 2000 Year of the call: 2001
support’ through credits. This shows that PROFIT did not fulfil the
requirement that public initiatives need to be stable to induce con-
fidence in target organizations (Shapira et al., 1995; Acosta and
Modrego, 2001).
In terms of regional differences, projects that included organi-
zations from Madrid, País Vasco and C. Valenciana received ‘high
support’ through subsidies. There was ‘selective support’ through
subsidies for projects with organizations from Andalucía, Canarias
and Murcia, and through credits for projects with organizations
from Baleares and Asturias, while projects with participation from
Navarra, Cantabria and Galicia received ‘low support’. We cannot
say whether these regional differences are due to political reasons
or the industry particularities of the region. However, there would
seem to be a relationship between the degree of development of
the region and the support received, with the exception perhaps of
Catalun˜a, one of the more developed regions in Spain which does
not seem to be particularly favoured in terms of either selection
or funding. Overall, these results support the arguments in Vence
(1998), that public R&D initiatives are usually focused on encour-
aging technological capacity to the detriment of regional cohesion.
Finally, regarding project inputs, there is a different impact of
number of working hours planned and project budget. The pub-
lic agency shows a high propensity to select projects with high
numbers of working hours and small budgets. If we differentiate
by financial instrument, we discovered that projects with large
budgets are given proportionately less support via either type of
instrument and that projects with large numbers of work hours
usually receive some funding through subsidies (Type2: Something
for everybody).
To summarize, our analysis reveals that the model proposed in
this paper is useful to understand the criteria used for public selec-
tion among cooperative R&D projects. In deciding how to select a
project and how much it will be awarded, the public agency con-
siders a set of factors, and the financial tools at its disposal. Our
understandingofpublic agencybehaviourwouldbeenhancedwere
we given access to data on organizational characteristics, which
would complete the picture of the factors underlying the public
selection and financing of cooperative R&D projects. However, the
present study complements the research carried out by Acosta and
Modrego (2001) and Blanes and Busom (2004), which focuses on
organizations’ decisions to apply for public support for R&D.
This research has some implications—including that public
behaviour does not always fit perfectly with declared objectives,
and there is a need for public decisions to be evaluated and for
the process to be more transparent. Learning about policy is not
straightforward (Nauwelaers and Wintjes, 2002), mainly because
evaluation studies encounter huge difficulties in relation to scarcity
of data (Cozzarin, 2008) and such evaluations that are performed
are seldom published (Feller et al., 1996). Future research should
try to develop a comprehensive database that allows: (i) taking
account of the characteristics of organizations; (ii) technical eval-
uation of referees; and (iii) takes account of the characteristics of
non-applicant organizations. It would also be interesting to anal-
yse several public initiatives in combination, to investigatewhether
and to what extent they are complementary. We are aware of the
difficulty of such a task because of lack of data on the project
evaluation process. However, such an exercise would improve the
coherence of the public agency’s goals with funding decisions and
project characteristics.
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